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To understand why the UN has its own administration of justice system, it is essential to
recall at the outset that the United Nations and its officials are immune from legal pro-
cess, absent a specific waiver. This immunity derives from Article 105 of the United Na-
tions Charter and the 1946 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the UN
("General Convention"). Specifically, Article II, Section 2 of the General Convention
provides that the "United Nations, its property and assets wherever located and by whom-
soever held, shall enjoy immunity from every form of legal process except insofar as in any
particular case it has expressly waived its immunity." Article V, Section 18 further pro-
vides that UN officials are immune "from legal process in respect of words spoken or
written and all acts performed by them in their official capacity."
The immunity of the United Nations from legal process does not, however, relieve the
Organization of legal liability. Article VIII, Section 29 of the General Convention obliges
the United Nations to "provide for an appropriate mode of settlement" in any case in
which it maintains its immunity but bears legal liability or responsibility.' For the settle-
ment of private law disputes, namely disputes relating to commercial contracts, the UN's
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preferred mode of dispute settlement is arbitration. All UN contracts contain a standard
clause providing for UNCITRAL arbitration.
In the context of employment disputes, staff members who wish to challenge employ-
ment decisions made by the UN are therefore unable to file claims against the Organiza-
tion under national laws or in national courts. The "UN administration of justice system"
refers to the regime of internal mechanisms that have been established to allow UN staff
members to pursue remedies for employment grievances. This system is self-regulated by
the Organization. The mechanisms in the UN administration of justice system include
the Joint Appeals Boards and the Joint Disciplinary Committees, which make recommen-
dations to the Secretary-General on administrative and disciplinary matters, respectively.
Where there is an allegation of non-compliance with the terms of a staff member's
employment, a decision of the Secretary-General may then be reviewed by the United
Nations Administrative Tribunal ("Tribunal"). The Tribunal was established by the Gen-
eral Assembly in its resolution 351 A (V) of 24 November 1949, as the highest judicial
body for the resolution of employment disputes within the United Nations.
In examining how the UN Administrative Tribunal has promoted Rule of Law within
the United Nations, it is important to refer to the definition of "Rule of Law" as used
within the United Nations. The Secretary-General has stated that the concept of "Rule of
Law":
"refers to a principle of governance in which all persons, institutions and entities, public and
private, including the State itself, are accountable to laws that are publicly promulgated,
equally enforced and independently adjudicated, and which are consistent with international
human rights norms and standards. It requires, as well, measures to ensure adherence to the
principles of supremacy of law, equality before the law, accountability to the law, fairness in
the application of the law, separation of powers, participation in decision-making, legal cer-
tainty, avoidance of arbitrariness and procedural and legal transparency. "2
While this definition was introduced in the context of promoting Rule of Law in con-
flict and post-conflict societies, it highlights a number of principles that are relevant to the
internal governance of the United Nations.
This article will focus on how the case law of the UN Administrative Tribunal has
affirmed key principles that are essential to promoting Rule of Law within the United
Nations, including the principles that:
* Laws should be consistent with international human rights standards
* There should be legal certainty and transparency in the implementation of laws
" Laws should be equally enforced and independently adjudicated
The article concludes with observations regarding the recent efforts to reform the ad-
ministration of justice system in the United Nations, and their implications for the Rule of
Law.
2. Secretary-General's Report on "The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict
societies" (S/2004/616), paragraph 6.
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II. Consistency of Law with International Human Rights Standards
The Tribunal has consistently affirmed that the laws and procedures of the Organiza-
tion must be consistent with international human rights standards. In particular, the Tri-
bunal has developed extensive case law with respect to the due process rights of staff
members during investigations. In its Fernandez judgment of 2003, the Tribunal issued a
resounding affirmation that due process rights are central to its proceedings:
"The right to due process of law is not merely a statutory privilege to he conferred and applied
at will. It is a fundamental right which serves as the cornerstone upon which the legitimacy of
any administrative Trihunal must rest. As such, the Tribunal is bound to zealously safeguard
it and consequently treat with any claimed infringement of it with the utmost concern. " 3
In the Araim case, which concerned a staff member who was dismissed for misconduct
on the basis of evidence provided by another staff member who surreptitiously searched
his computer, the Tribunal ruled that:
"It cannot accept that investigations could be conducted without rules and guarantees of due
process and without giving due respect to inalienable rights as proclaimed by the Organization
itself in the Declaration on Human Rights. This is regardless of what the internal regula-
tions of the Organization say as to its rights to the contents of the staffs computers."4
In recent years, the Tribunal has further elaborated on the component of the right to
due process during investigations, ruling that the right requires informing staff members
of the allegations against them, providing them with an opportunity to defend themselves
before an adverse decision is taken,5 informing them of the identity of persons who have
complained against them,6 and giving them a chance to cross-examine witnesses during an
investigation.7
m. Legal Certainty and Transparency in the Implementation of Laws
An additional component of due process is compliance with established procedures for
decision-making, which is essential for ensuring legal certainty and transparency. As the
Chief Administrative Officer of the Organization, under Article 97 of the United Nations
Charter, the Secretary-General enjoys a broad degree of discretion in administering staff.
The Tribunal has ruled that while it "does not substitute its judgment for the discretion of
the Respondent, he must follow his own rules."8
In 1996, two staff members (Ms. Gordon and Mr. Pelanne) were denied the opportu-
nity to be considered for vacancies, which were filled without first circulating vacancy
announcements, as required in the relevant rules. These rules also required promotion
decisions to be reviewed by an Appointment and Promotion Board. Instead, the Secre-
tary-General simply informed the Appointment and Promotion Board that two other staff
3. Judgement No. 1146, Fernandez (2003).
4. Judgement No. 1022, Araim (2001), paragraph IX.
5. Judgments No. 1176, Parra (2004 and No. 1154, Hussain (2003).
6. Judgments No. 983, Idriss (1999) and No. 1246, Sokoloff (2005).
7. Judgement No. 1260, Singhal (2005).
8. Judgement No. 949, Yung (1999), paragraph VII.
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members had already been assigned to the posts in question. The Secretary-General
maintained that the "irregularities in the filling of the two D-I posts were due to urgent
exigencies of service and that the two posts had to be filled on an expedited basis." 9 The
Secretary-General accepted the recommendation of the Joint Appeals Board to pay com-
pensation in the amount of two months' salary to the two staff members who had been
denied the opportunity to be considered for promotion. The Applicants, however, con-
sidered that the compensation was insufficient and filed an application with the Tribunal.
In its judgment on Gordon and Pelanne rendered in 1998, the Tribunal found in favour of
the staff members, holding that:
"[aflthough the damage suffered by the Applicants is difficult to assess in monetary terms,
clearly the Applicants should have been awarded more than two months net base salary for
such a flagrant disregard of their rights by the very authority charged with protecting
them. . . . Moreover, the Tribunal cannot take lightly the violation of due process by the
Respondent, particularly when the [rules on appointment and promotion were] enacted by him
in order to prevent the very practices to which he resorted in this case. "10
When determining whether to award compensation, the Tribunal normally examines
the degree of harm suffered by the staff member as a result of the Organization's failure to
comply with procedures. In a number of cases, however, the Tribunal has held that the
violation of procedural rights in and of itself constitutes a sufficient basis to award com-
pensation even where the staff member has suffered no injury or harm. For example, in
the Helke case, a staff member was denied an education grant. When the Joint Appeals
Board considered his appeal, it requested the Organization and the Swiss authorities to
provide information relevant to the appeal. Contrary to its rules, however, the JAB did
not share the information provided with the staff member concerned. The Tribunal ruled
that
.though [it] believes that the information, which the JAB obtained, was such that it was
very readily accessible and consequently the Applicant did not suffer injury by not being given
the opportunity to comment thereon. . ., formal procedures are safeguards which must be
strictly complied with. The failure of the JAB to provide the Applicant with copies of the
requests for clarification and to afford him the opportunity to comment thereon, represents an
irregularity which amounts to a violation of the Applicant's right to due process, for which the
Applicant should be compensated. "I I
IV. Equal Enforcement and Independent Adjudication of the Law
In the context of the United Nations, the equal enforcement and independent adjudica-
tion of the law has meant, inter alia, that UN employment rules and policies should be
applied equally, irrespective of the nationality of the staff members concerned and any
pressures exerted by particular Member States.
9. Judgement No. 914, Gordan and Pelanne (1999), paragraph il.
10. Ibid, paragraph VIII.
11. Judgement No. 1047, Helke (2005), paragraph V.
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Independence from Member States is an essential principle of the international civil
service and is enshrined in Article 100(1) of the United Nations Charter which prohibits
the Secretary-General and staff members from "seek[ing] or receiv[ing] instructions from
any government or from any other authority external to the Organization" in the per-
formance of their duties.
This principle was examined in the case of Qiu, Zbou and Yao, brought by three Chinese
translators who had been seconded to the United Nations from the Government of the
People's Republic of China. After five years of service, the three staff members requested
to be granted career appointments. The request was denied by the Secretary-General on
the grounds that objections had been raised by the Chinese Government. The Tribunal
held that all decisions relating to continued employment must be made independently
from the wishes of the seconding Government and that "the Secretary-General could not
defer to this opposition by the Chinese Mission without being in breach of his obligations
under the Charter and the Staff Rules."' 2 Moreover, the judgment contained a separate
declaration concurring in the Tribunal's decision and noting that in considering the Appli-
cants for a career appointment, the procedure established by the Administration had failed
to observe the "requirements of due process including the absence of discrimination." 3
Another case also involving the exertion of pressure by a Member State was the Al Souki
case in 2005. The case involved a staff member of the UNDP Country Office in the
United Arab Emirates (UAE) whose fixed-term contract was not renewed after the UAE
Government requested UNDP to replace a number of staff members with UAE nationals.
The staff member challenged the non-renewal of his contract. In reviewing the case, the
Tribunal noted the complexities of the relationship between UNDP and Member States,
given that, inter alia, Member States contribute to the budget of UNDP. The Tribunal,
however, ruled in favour of the staff member, emphasizing that the "independent func-
tioning of the Organization requires that [pressures from Member States] be resisted and
the fundamental tenets upon which the United Nations was founded be upheld."14
V. Reform of the Administration of Justice System in the United Nations
The recent efforts to reform the administration of justice system began in 2005 when
the General Assembly, in its resolution 49/283, requested the Secretary-General to form a
panel of experts to consider a redesign of the system. In its report A/61/205, the Redesign
Panel concluded that the current system was outmoded, dysfunctional, ineffective, and
lacked independence.
The Redesign Panel proposed a number of significant changes to the system, which
were largely accepted by the Secretary-General and subsequently reviewed by the General
Assembly. In 2007, the General Assembly approved the establishment of a two-tiered
judicial system, comprised of the UN Dispute Tribunal and the UN Appeals Tribunal,
which will replace the current Joint Appeals Board, Joint Disciplinary Committees, and
the UN Administrative Tribunal.' 5 In December 2008, the General Assembly approved
the Statutes of the new Tribunals, which will become operational on 1 July 2009, and
12. Judgement No. 482, Qiu, Zhou and Tao (1990), paragraphs XLI-XLfl.
13. Ibid, Declaration by Mr. Jerome Ackerman.
14. Judgement No. 1275, Al Souki (2005), paragraph XI.
15. General Assembly resolution 61/261 (2007).
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decided that the United Nations Administrative Tribunal would be abolished as of 31
December 2009. The General Assembly did not, however, approve a proposal to extend
the jurisdiction of the new system to non-staff members, such as consultants, whose dis-
putes with the Organization under the current system are resolved through arbitration.
One crucial element of the reform relevant to the Rule of Law is the new procedure for
the nomination and appointment of judges which is intended to enhance judicial indepen-
dence. At present, judges of the UN Administrative Tribunal are nominated by Member
States and appointed by the General Assembly. A number of tribunals created by the
United Nations-for example, the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugo-
slavia and Rwanda and the International Criminal Court-all have judges who are nomi-
nated by Member States. While the case law of the Tribunal clearly dispels any concerns
that such a process may compromise the independence of the Tribunal from the Member
States, the Redesign Panel nevertheless recommended the establishment of an Internal
Justice Council to compile lists of candidates for appointment as judges in the Organiza-
tion's internal justice system. This mechanism is similar to that which was utilized in the
appointment of judges to the European Union Civil Service Tribunal, created in 2005. A
committee comprising former members of the European Court of Justice and the Court
of First Instance, as well as lawyers with expertise in adjudicating disputes between the
European Union and its civil servants, was established to review and identify qualified
judicial candidates.
Similarly, in its resolution 62/228, the General Assembly established the Internal Justice
Council to "[p]rovide its views and recommendations to the General Assembly on two or
three candidates for each vacancy in the United Nations Dispute Tribunal and the United
Nations Appeals Tribunal." In the new administration of justice system, the General As-
sembly will still have a principal role in the appointment of judges. The fact that the
General Assembly will be appointing these judges from a list compiled by an independent
body, the Internal Justice Council, however, will contribute to easing any perception that
the appointment of the judges is politicized and dominated by the interests of Member
States.
Candidates were invited to submit their applications for the vacancies on the Tribunals
byJuly 2008, and more than 240 applications from over 50 countries were received. After
meeting to review the applications at the end of July 2008, the Internal Justice Council
shortlisted 40 candidates who were interviewed and required to take a written examination
at the beginning of September. The Council's report containing recommendations on the
judicial candidates was submitted to the General Assembly in October 2008 and formed
the basis for the General Assembly's appointment of the judges to the UN Dispute Tribu-
nal and UN Appeals Tribunal in March 2009.
VI. Conclusion
As the United Nations and its officials are immune from national laws and national
courts, the administration of justice system in the United Nations is essential for ensuring
that staff members have an adequate forum for the resolution of their employment-related
disputes. In this context, the UN Administrative Tribunal has played a critical role in
promoting the Rule of Law in the United Nations, by affirming that laws applied by the
United Nations should be consistent with international human rights, that there should be
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legal certainty and transparency in the implementation of laws and that laws should be
equally enforced and independently adjudicated.
At this early stage, it would be premature to make any predictions about the new ad-
ministration of justice system. In the author's personal view, it is regrettable that the
stringent qualifications established by the General Assembly for appointment to the UN
Dispute Tribunal and the Appeals Tribunal (10 and 15 years of judicial experience, respec-
tively) may have been unduly restrictive, by excluding lawyers with relevant experience in
law firms, non-governmental organizations and national civil service simply because they
have not held judicial office. The establishment of the Internal Justice Council and new
procedures for the election of the judges are, however, a positive development. If one of
the purposes of reforming the administration of justice system is to instill greater confi-
dence in the independence of the Tribunals, having a judicial selection process that is
more transparent and less politicized will certainly contribute to enhancing the legitimacy
and perceived impartiality of the Tribunals.
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